Curahee: a miraculous recovery
On May 7, 2008, an IED exploded beneath a humvee in Afghanistan, killing three and seriously wounding Army 1st Lt. Brian Brennan of Howell, NJ and Specialist Ryan Price of California. Lt. Brennan suffered cardiac arrest, multiple fractures, the loss of both his legs, and a serious traumatic brain injury that placed him in a coma.
The story of his recovery is nothing short of miraculous. Watch the video.
Mr. Brennan’s foundation is here.
In: Military · Tagged with: Afghanistan
Major changes needed in Afghanistan
Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Tom McInerney writes that if we are to win in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal isn’t the only official worthy of firing, and President Obama must abandon his denial that we are at war with “radical Islam.” (HT Kenny B.)
First to the State Department: Ambassadors Eikenberry and Holbrooke have long outlived their effectiveness. They are a drag on success in this difficult war. They must go.
Next, to the Department of Defense: This a war is not an “Overseas Contigency Operation (OCO)” as President Obama’s administration calls it. We have lost 89 ISAF soldiers and 53 US soldiers this month with 2 days left to go.Mr. President, we are in a violent war against radical Islam and your denial of this fact will ensure our defeat.
You and your administration cannot even define the ideology we are fighting against. John Brennan, your National Security adviser for counterterrorism, thinks “jihad” means “holy struggle” not a war against infidels.
Your Secretary of Defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have accepted these ridiculous new definitions of the threat.
This means you, and your national security leadership team are clueless about how to defeat this violent threat against America.
They must all go and you must change your senseless strategy.
It is unfortunate that nearly all of the flag officers that make sense have retired.
I have seen no indications that this administration desires victory in Afghanistan. We can debate who should be sacked and who shouldn’t be, but regardless of whether McChrystal, Petraeus, or Sun Tzu is commanding ISAF, the result will look pretty much the same as they must follow the Commander-in-Chief. So rather than simply sacking commanders and ambassadors (treating the symptoms and not the disease), I would like to take things one step further: Let’s go back to the drawing board.
The president must answer these questions (truthfully):
- Who is our enemy in Afghanistan and what are their intentions?
- What are our intentions in Afghanistan?
- How do you define victory in Afghanistan?
- What are you doing to achieve victory in Afghanistan?
America deserves clear and concise answers, not lies and distractions. If his answers stink, then “We the People” must remind him that the government ultimately works for us. We must fight in Afghanistan – that’s not the debate we should have. It should be who we are fighting and how we should fight them. Worry about firing commanders and diplomats after we have a solid and just foundation.
In: Military, Politics · Tagged with: Afghanistan, Obama administration
What did McChrystal say?
Diana West wrote months ago that Gen. Stan McChrystal had several serious flaws (seven by her count), worthy of dismissing the general only weeks after taking command of all troops in Afghanistan. To me, this one was the worst:
“Preoccupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us – physically and psychologically – from the
people we seek to protect,” McChrystal wrote in a 2009 memo.
First, there is nothing that we can do to win the hearts and minds of the “people we seek to protect” whom it just so happens are religiously commanded to either kill, convert, or subjugate non-Muslims. And how on earth is putting the protection of our own forces first a negative in the eyes of a military officer? West writes:
That a general could write so disparagingly of the means to preserve his soldiers at least to fight another day is despicable. But this is what zealots do. They serve theories, not men; they see visions, not reality. And that theory, that vision is akin to the familiar Marxist notion, likely imbibed during PC school days, that denies that identity, religion, and culture matter. In the resulting tunnel vision, the so-called hearts and minds strategy looks like a winner.
This is the underlying basis of the counterinsurgency warfare now in vogue. “Hearts and minds” is not only the flawed rationale behind “nation building,” it also inspires the restrictive rules of engagement finally causing unease at home. This strategy – now framed as “the battle for the support of the [Afghan] people” — must be junked if our military is ever to be used effectively and appropriately.
McChrystal did say one thing in the memo that I agreed with: “The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves.”
That is exactly what is happening. But with a new commander in Afghanistan, we can push for Congressional hearings on the Rules of Engagement. Untying the hands of our troops will go a long way towards defeating the Taliban and al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist groups. But that will not happen unless Americans unite behind our troops, and press Congress to investigate the ROE.
In: Military · Tagged with: Afghanistan, counterinsurgency, Rules of Engagement
Fifth anniversary of Operation Redwing
Michael Murphy and Matt Axelson - two of the fallen warriors from Operation Redwing (Source: MattAxelson.com)
On June 27, 2005, a four-man Navy SEAL sniper watch team set out to conduct a mission in some of the harshest terrain on earth – about 10,000 feet above sea level in the Hindu Kush Mountains of Afghanistan. Their mission was to locate and gather intelligence on a certain high-ranking Taliban official with known ties to Osama bin-Laden. Once they had eyes on the target, a larger force would then attack, capturing or killing the target. According to their intelligence, the SEALs would be operating amongst as many as 200 enemy fighters.
In the fighting that followed, 11 Navy SEALs and eight Army Task Force 160 aircrew died in the battle. Operation Redwing was the highest loss of life for the Naval Special Warfare Command since the D-Day invasion of Normandy in World War II.
One man survived. Unto the Breach recalls his incredible story.
The team was inserted at night by helicopter into the heavily-forested and mountainous terrain east of Asadabad, a village in the Afghanistan province of Kunar. Intelligence reported that a large group of armed men slipped through a pass in the mountains from Pakistan. The size of the force suggested that there was a valuable target in the area. This area was considered a “hornet’s nest,” a Taliban stronghold that Coalition Forces rarely ventured into. The inhabitants were goat herders and wood cutters, and the Taliban rewarded them for shooting U.S. forces or reporting on their locations.
The clouds were low and heavy rains poured down on the team. They had set up and began observing the area, but could not manage a clear line of sight on the target area. They moved in closer, taking a position about one mile from the village.
Continue reading about the mission here, and buy Marcus Luttrell’s book – I guarantee it will be one of the best you will ever read. Just don’t make the mistake of loaning it out as I did – you won’t get it back. (fortunately it wasn’t signed).
In: Military History · Tagged with: Afghanistan, Operation Redwing
Super Hornet over Kajaki Dam
An F/A-18E Super Hornet flies over the Kajaki Dam reservoir in Afghanistan, May 20, 2010. The aircraft is part of Strike Fighter Squadron 83. The squadron is assigned to the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, which is at sea in the Persian Gulf and Middle East regions. U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Cmdr. Ben Stickney
In: Images, Military · Tagged with: Afghanistan, US Navy
Beautiful Afghan landscape
River valley in Logar Province, Afghanistan (Photo by Eric Sutphin, U.S. Army)
In: Images, Military · Tagged with: Afghanistan
Military Mysteriously Cuts Short Top War Correspondent’s Time in Afghanistan
The military has cut short a war correspondent’s embed, and there may be evidence that the decision may have been part of a smear campaign against the writer.
Michael Yon, a former Green Beret, has been covering Iraq and Afghanistan for six years. He has also covered conflicts in Thailand, the Philippines, and Nepal. Following a string of events covered by Yon that cast a negative light on two top NATO commanders, the military decided to terminate Yon’s embed prematurely, citing reasons that didn’t add up.
ISAF’s reason for disembedding Yon was “embed overcrowding.” Yet in an email to Admiral Gregory J. Smith, an ISAF public affairs officer, Yon wrote, “I rarely see journalists. Those journalists I see have been doing drive-by reporting.”
Yon states that he has forwarded to his attorney “compelling evidence” of a smear campaign perpetrated by members of Gen. McChrystal’s staff. He says that the general’s staff have released official statements that are “defamatory and libelous.”
“A writer must be able to spot libel just as a soldier must be able to spot IEDs,” writes Yon. “It’s part of the job. If you can’t spot it, you will get hurt.”
In: Articles, Media, Military · Tagged with: Afghanistan
Leaflet drop in Afghanistan
A UH-60 Blackhawk flies over some scenic landscape while traveling to the location of a leaflet drop in Joghatoe District, Logar Province, Afghanistan, April 23, 2010. The leaflets are informing the people of Joghatoe District of an upcoming radio broadcast. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Russell Gilchrest\Released)
In: Images, Military · Tagged with: Afghanistan
NATO’s proposed ‘Courageous Restraint’ medal – another victory for our enemies
The military’s rules of engagement (ROE) in Afghanistan have become so emasculated that commanders are now considering the creation of a medal awarded for not using lethal force during war.
NATO Commander General Stanley McChrystal is currently reviewing the “Courageous Restraint” medal, which was suggested by British Maj. Gen. Nick Carter following an incident where U.S. soldiers fired on a bus carrying Afghan civilians.
“The idea is being reviewed at Headquarters [International Security Force Afghanistan],” said Lt. Col. Edward Sholtis, the spokesman for Gen. McChrystal. “The idea is consistent with our approach. Our young men and women display remarkable courage every day, including situations where they refrain from using lethal force, even at risk to themselves, in order to prevent possible harm to civilians. … That restraint is an act of discipline and courage not much different than those seen in combat actions.”
However, restraint hasn’t translated into progress on the battlefield. A recent report from the Pentagon revealed that violence in Afghanistan is increasing – up 87% from last year – and that more districts support the Taliban than did six months ago (none of the 92 districts surveyed actively support the Karzai government while 42 are sympathetic to the Taliban).
While our forces build infrastructure, provide medical care, and show restraint on the battlefield, the Taliban acts like barbarians – intimidating, raping, and murdering. Yet when our troops act in self-defense, Afghans gather in protest, chanting “Death to America.”
In April, a bus approached a convoy of engineers in Kandahar City at a high rate of speed, ignoring multiple attempts to get the driver to slow down. Due to poor visibility conditions, and the high threat of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices in the district, the soldiers opened fire, killing four passengers and wounding 18.
In: Articles, Military · Tagged with: Afghanistan, NATO, Rules of Engagement, Stanley McChrystal
Statistics don’t look good for COIN
Things are going from bad to worse in Afghanistan. How is it possible to conduct a successful counterinsurgency campaign in a country that 1.) doesn’t support it’s own government; 2.) despises foreigners – especially non-Muslims; and 3.) in many cases, prefers the Taliban?
From a post by Juan Cole highlighting the recent Pentagon study on the war in Afghanistan:
NATO is operating in about 100 districts of the country (the vague equivalent of counties).
Number of Afghans in 92 districts (assessed for their relationship to the Federal government) that actively support the government of Hamid Karzai: 0
Number of districts out of 92 that are neutral toward the government: 44
Number of districts sympathetic to the insurgency in March 2010: 48
Number of districts that had been sympathetic to the insurgency in June, 2009: 33
Increase in violent incidents from Feb. 2009 to March 2010: 87 percent.
I support our military – which means I want our troops to have the best equipment, training, leaders, and strategy possible. When we have been fighting in Afghanistan for nearly nine years, and as we see above, our “won-loss record” (regarding the districts referenced above) is 0-48-44, it is past time to consider changing game plans. And by changing plans, I do NOT mean leaving Afghanistan. We have no choice but to fight.
This would never fly in sports, and it sure as hell shouldn’t be the case when lives are being lost.
In: Geopolitics · Tagged with: Afghanistan, counterinsurgency
